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                  The Clandestine Lives of Colonel David Smiley: Code  Name ‘Grin’by Clive Jones
 |   This  is a book about a remarkable and gallant officer; it is also a book about  Hybrid Warfare, long before General Gerasimov made the concept famous. Finally,  it is a book about the varied failings of the military system, in particular  its inability in peacetime properly to employ and retain (p.282) the type of  officers whom it needs in war – an issue with which it seems still to struggle. 
 Clive  Jones is Professor of Regional Security at Durham University’s School of  Government and International Affairs, and this compliments one of his previous  works, Britain and the Yemen Civil War 1962-1965. That delved deeply  into the activities of the British Mercenary Organisation over three years;  this covers Smiley’s life in its entirety over several campaigns. It is  interesting from a military history point of view, from a Middle East regional  perspective – and as a forerunner of the type of conflict which British Forces  have experienced ‘anew’ over the past two decades.
 
 The  work is structured chronologically around discrete phases of Smiley’s life:  regimental duty, pre-War and on operations in Abyssinia, Palestine, Iraq and  Iran, service with the Commandos, then with the Special Operations Executive in  Albania and Siam; his post-military service in the Mediterranean, Oman, and in  Yemen, and finally a valedictory chapter.
 
 Many  of the situations in which Smiley found himself and the comments that he  recorded would not be out of place today, such as when working with local  forces. For example: ‘Many BLOs came to spend as much time trying to reconcile  competing ideological and political agendas between various partisan and  guerrilla groups as they did fighting the Germans and Italians’. Similarly,  Smiley experienced the competing political agendas of allies, also seen in  recent conflicts: ‘Under the umbrella of SEAC, the activities and policies of  the OSS and Force 136 should have been coordinated. In reality, both services  ran separate operations into Siam with little joint planning’
 
 In  parallel to the repeating situations, many of the locations in which Smiley  soldiered, Raqqa, Habaniyya, Baghdad, Hebron, Iran, Yemen, Benghazi, southern  Siam etc, are again scenes of conflict: geo-strategic issues, ethnic complications  and complex terrain remain mostly the same, no matter the flag that flies over  them. Often the recurrent locations are replete with recurrent notable families  as allies or enemies, and sometimes both, as with the Palmach terrorists’  looting of a British armoury ‘under the instruction of a Jewish intelligence  officer responsible for field security around the base’.
 
 Throughout,  there are interesting details about the various campaigns, which – as well as  echoing the current conflicts – illuminate hitherto unexplained aspects, such  as the way the deception plan for the assault on J Akhdhar was disseminated; or  the price for Israeli logistical support to the Royalists in Yemen being  political recognition of Israel (as well as tying down and degrading Nasser’s  army in Yemen: ‘At the time of [the 6 Day War] Egypt still had over 50,000  troops in Yemen’.
 
 While  Jones is an academic, this is not solely an academic’s book; it is written in  fluid English and annotated adequately but not excessively. Jones draws upon  primary and secondary documentary sources, as well as interviews with many of  those involved, including with Smiley himself.
 
 Inevitably,  there are a couple of minor mistakes: the Euphrates can be crossed but not  forded just above Baghdad; the cap comforter becomes a camp comforter (p.104);  most Sana’anis are Zaydi, not Shafa’i. There are also the usual issues of  transliteration from Arabic such as Kameshle for Qamishli, Shaffei for Shafa’i  etc; Jones also uses GI and GII for G1 and G2. These are rarely such as to  cause confusion.
 
 As  too often, a major issue is with the quality of the mapping, and in particular  the lack of terrain. In Albania, Oman and Yemen, the immensely complex terrain  (‘the brutally rugged mountain terrain where the fighting was taking place’)  greatly favours asymmetric forces. Yet from the book’s sketch maps, one would  have thought that the terrain closely resembled Norfolk’s. The other major  issue is the extortionate price: at £80 in hardback, the book is clearly aimed  at university libraries with lavish budgets (and still lacks decent mapping  despite that iniquitous price.) The paperback is a more reasonable £24.99.
 
 This  is a readable and engaging book about a swashbuckling Household Division  officer (and war correspondent for this magazine), who never received in life  the full recognition from his country that he deserved. This book goes a  considerable way to righting that wrong, as well as being an interesting window  on relevant, if forgotten, campaigns. Highly recommended.
 James Spencer
 edinburghuniversitypress.com   |  |